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ABSTRACT 
An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual 
force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic 
voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less 
sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote 
effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty 
evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a 
micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European 
nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election 
outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this 
economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that 
economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic 
growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates. 
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The first studies on economics and elections forged macrolevel links. Different macroeconomic indicators 
sometimes showed themselves determinants of national incumbent support, measured in votes or 
popularity. [See the reviews of Nannestad and Paldam (1994); Norpoth (1996); Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier (2000).] The inference is that democratic voters are economic, rewarding the government for 
good times, and punishing it for bad. However, this inference, reported by itself, remains suspect because 
of the ecological fallacy (Kramer, 1983; Robinson, 1950). That is, individual voters may not act this way, 
in which case observed national economy-election patterns are spurious. To counter this possibility, 
studies have moved to the microlevel, examining voters in election surveys. These efforts were initially on 
individual democracies – notably the United States, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom. [See, as 
examples, respectively, Kiewiet (1983); Lewis-Beck (1983); Borre (1997); Sanders (2003).] Then, 
investigations became evermore micro and comparative, stretching across larger and larger samples of 
nations (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 1988). Over a broad range of democracies, in time and 
space, survey work supports the economic voter hypothesis. [See the current reviews of Duch (2007); 
Hellwig (2010); Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007).] With minor caveats, then, the ecological fallacy 
argument has not been sustained. 
However, another classic, the fallacy of composition, has not received the scrutiny it deserves 
(Blackburn, 2008: 69). That fallacy occurs when the truth of the part is not true for the whole. An opposite 
of the ecological fallacy, we label it here the micrological fallacy, a usage paralleling the micro/macro 
distinction in economics (where what makes sense at the micro-level may not make sense at the macro-
level, as the notorious Paradox of Thrift illustrates). Specifically in election studies, while individual 
voters may appear to be economic voters, all voters taken together may not reflect the changing state of 
the economy. Put another way, the collective vote of the national electorate might not respond to national 
economic conditions, despite a seemingly supportive microfoundation. If this micrological fallacy holds, 
then the importance of the economic vote declines greatly. Why? Because it would suggest that economic 
evaluation, as expressed by individual citizens, does not ultimately hold the government accountable. A 
government presiding over bad national economic conditions, such as poor growth or rising 
unemployment, could escape punishment at the ballot box. Democracy, then, stands badly served. Using a 
formidable database of European nations, we examine whether national governments, in fact, are punished 
(or rewarded) by votes on the basis of national economic performance. We look at the general case, voting 
in normal times, then at voting in times of crisis. Of special interest is the possibility that governments are 
held still more accountable for the economy during crisis periods. 
Below, we look at relevant literature and theory, where we elaborate on the possibilites for the 
micrological fallacy. That discussion leads to the formulation of two hypotheses for testing, with regard to 
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the relationship of macroeconomics and electoral outcomes, one hypothesis for normal times and another 
for times of crisis. Then we discuss our European data pool and our politico-economic measures, followed 
by an explication of our methodology. Our estimated equations are presented in three parts: static, 
dynamic, and crisis. In conclusion, we reconcile the micrological fallacy, and trace a myriad of 
macroeconomic effects on European electoral outcomes.  
 
LITERATURE AND THEORY 
 The scope of the economic voting literature, now estimated at over 500 articles and books, makes 
its summary difficult (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck, 2012). However, it can be simplified by focusing 
theoretically on the classic economic voting paradigm, and substantively on the relevant comparative 
findings. With respect to theory, the organizing idea is retrospective economic voting, wherein the voter 
judges the economic record of the government, rewarding or punishing accordingly at the ballot box 
(Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966; Lewis-Beck, 1988). With respect to comparative findings, we examine 
essentially European studies, first at the microlevel, then at the macrolevel. Reviewing the microlevel 
investigations, where the data are national surveys and the dependent variable is a measure of the 
incumbent vote, they converge on the notion that sociotropic economic evaluations matter (Anderson, 
2000; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fernandez-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig, 2008; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; 
Nadeau et al., 2013; van der Eijk et al., 2007). When the respondent perceives the economy has worsened 
over the past year, they are significantly more likely to declare a vote against the government (coalition).  
The most recent of these microlevel efforts repeatedly tests the economic voting hypothesis with 
the largest micro-pool yet (40 surveys from ten European nations – Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom). The authors conclude: “the 
economy is not a mirage. Voters see it, and see it rather clearly…. Economic perceptions, properly 
understood, have a greater impact than previously imagined.” Nadeau et al. (2013: 565). These strong 
micro-findings contrast to mixed macrolevel findings, from Eastern as well as Western Europe. These 
aggregate analyses may uncover statistically significant relationships between an objective economic 
indicator and incumbent vote support, but they can be substantively weak (Bengtsson, 2004; Chappell and 
Veiga, 2000; Fidrmuc, 2000; Paldam, 1991; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Tufte, 1978). Moreover, there is 
no agreement on relevant indicators. As Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000: 211) ask, “Which one? … It 
could be unemployment, inflation or growth,” because the answer varies depending on the study. In 
summarizing this aggregate work, the far-reaching investigation of Bengtsson (2004: 764) concludes that 
“One overarching result from this and other studies does, however, seem to be that the fundamental 
 4 
economic effects … are rather weak or non-existent (italics added.)” These spotty results reinforce our 
fear that the micrological fallacy has been at play, leaving the macrolevel apparently free of any serious 
economics-elections connection. 
The micrological fallacy stands opposite of the ecological fallacy. While both are fallacies of 
inference, the latter makes the mistake of inferring the part from the whole, e.g., inferring individual 
economic voting from aggregate patterns connecting macroeconomic indicators and election outcomes. 
The former, in contrast, makes the mistake of inferring the whole from the part, e.g., inferring an 
aggregate economics-elections connection from individual patterns of economic voting. In comparative 
economic voting research, the door stands open to the commitment of a micrological fallacy, given the 
contradiction between the micro-level, individual survey results and the macro-level, aggregate results. 
That is, strong micro-findings co-exist with weak to non-existent macro-findings. Two initial micro-
possibilities might explain this apparent inconsistency First, individual economic perceptions of the 
national economy could be based on error. Second, these economic perceptions could be accurate, but not 
add up to the observed macroeconomic condition.  
The first possibility was originally posed by Kramer (1983), in his critique of the survey as an 
instrument for measuring the economy. In particular, he saw sociotropic retrospective items as error-laden, 
with respondents in the same survey exhibiting widespread disagreement over the condition of the 
national economy. Part of this error could come from partisan bias for or against the incumbent party 
(Evans and Andersen, 2006), and another part from general misinformation (Anderson, 2007: 280). 
Current comparative work suggests that these sources of measurement error do not exercise significant 
effects, once instrumental variable controls are imposed (Nadeau et al., 2013). But other sources of 
measurement error could be at work. Much of the survey research bases itself on indirect measures of the 
vote, e.g., vote intention. It is easy to imagine that vote intention correlates less than perfectly with actual 
vote. Moreover, it may well correlate with the independent variable of economic perception in biased 
ways. Further, even assuming vote intention has no systematic measurement error, it usually represents a 
cross-sectional response in a slice-in-time survey. Therefore, it does not measure a change in vote 
intention in response to a real change in the economy, as economic voting theory implies.  
What about the second possibility, concerning how individual perceptions add up to the objective 
macro-result? If individual voters perceive the national economy without error, then when those opinions 
are aggregated they should represent national performance, e.g., if each voter accurately sees positive 
economic growth, then those perceptions, when aggregated, will show positive economic growth. This 
inference holds even if, only on average, voters correctly perceive positive economic growth; the 
assumption here is that the error term in the vote equation lacks correlation with the economic perception 
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(Lewis-Beck et al., 2013). However, that error term may be correlated with the X of economic perception. 
For example, vote turnout, an omitted variable reflected in the error term, could influence vote choice. A 
typical case could be when the voter sees a strong economy and so does not bother to vote, since things 
are going well (Lewis-Beck and Lockerbie, 1989). Under such a scenario, the economic motivation behind 
the vote would not be accurately reflected in the aggregate electoral outcome. Such a result could help 
explain rather weak aggregate economic voting results, in the face of apparently strong individual 
assessments. 
The two foregoing individual-level possibilities for inducing a micrological fallacy concern the 
“part” of the “whole.” There is also a third (aggregate-level) possibility, concerning just the “whole” - the 
measurement of the macroeconomy itself. Obviously, if at the aggregate-level the economy is improperly, 
or incompletely, measured in a model predicting electoral outcomes, then its effect might not register. As 
noted, the leading measures have been versions of unemployment, inflation, or growth (at different lags).  
We would argue that the growth variable stands least likely to feed the micrological fallacy, because of its 
empirical precision and conceptual breadth. GDP growth, as Norpoth et al. (1991: 5) suggested some time 
ago, allows us to formulate models with an economic indicator “as global as possible….to capture the 
shifting weighting scheme utilized in the political economic calculus of the democratic voter.”  This 
measurement strategy receives support, in a preliminary way, in the findings of Wilken et al. (1997). Their 
early cross-sectional examination of 38 world elections (from developed and underdeveloped 
democracies, 1988-1994) concludes that for “every percentage point of GDP growth in the election year, 
[the incumbent] party stands to gain 1.4 percent of the vote.” (Wilken et al., 1997: 307). Further, more 
recent economic voting work, by Singer (2011a) and Van der Brug et al. (2007), explicitly supports the 
use of GDP growth, over inflation and unemployment measures, on grounds that it yields the largest 
effect. 
These foregoing considerations lead us to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Positive (negative) GDP growth yields increases (decreases) in incumbent vote support. 
We expect H1 to be supported as a general proposition, when tested against our macro-data-set on 
European electorates. Such support would be all to the good for, as Paldam (1991: 11) observes: “it is 
highly desirable if models are general and institution free, so that the same basic model works across 
countries and over time.” After all, the model being tested derives itself from the pure theory of the 
economic vote. However, as subsequent research has shown, the economic vote, even if a pure force, can 
be conditioned by institutions and events (Nadeau et al., 2002; Powell and Whitten, 1993). Therefore, we 
do explore further tests, especially on the clarity of responsibility idea, as shall be seen below. 
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Of further interest are the electoral effects of the recent international economic crisis, beginning 
around 2008. [See, in particular, the respective special symposiums of Escobar-Lemon and Whitten 
(2011); Lewis-Beck, Costa Lobo, and Bellucci (2012); Lewis-Beck and Whitten (2013)]. With economic 
policy reform supreme on the agenda of most European governments, we might expect to find there a 
strengthening of the economic voting effect. If the link between the economy and incumbent vote share 
becomes more pronounced in times of economic crisis, then the relation between the economy and 
incumbency voting would be asymmetric. Different strands of evidence can be marshalled for this 
asymmetry argument. First, voters have sometimes been found to be more responsive to negative 
economic information, as opposed to positive economic information. Given that people are risk averse, 
negative messages receive more weight (Lau, 1985). This effect can be further enhanced by negativity 
bias in the media as well (Soroka, 2006). Second, issues on top of voters’ heads are more salient factors 
determining their vote (Bélanger and Meguid, 2008). For example, Fournier et al. (2003: 57) claim that 
“issue importance influences the capacity to rate the government’s performance: individuals who feel that 
an issue is important are more likely to evaluate the government on that issue”. 
 More specifically, in times of economic recession, the economy would have more salience to 
voters. For one, that information on the economy is more easily accessible in times of crisis, according to 
the work of (Singer, 2011a). Further, Singer (2011b) shows that during an economic recession more 
citizens perceive the impact of the economy on their personal situation. These findings accord with the 
earlier European results from Nannestad and Paldam (1997), who showed the presence of a grievance 
asymmetry at the individual level. Danish voters’ evaluations of the economy were stronger predictors of 
support for government parties when voters perceived a worsening economy, as opposed to an improving 
economy. However, not all micro-studies support such a result. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013), in their 
current review of the problem, conclude that overall micro-level evidence on the asymmetry hypothesis is 
“mixed.” With regard specifically to its presence in times of economic crisis, the debate still continues [for 
a review there, see Singer, 2011a]. Given the different theoretical arguments (and scattered empirical 
evidence) for an asymmetric economic vote induced by the condition of crisis itself, we tentatively offer 
our second hypothesis: 
H2: During economic crisis, GDP growth relates more strongly to incumbent vote support. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
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The dataset covers 359 elections in 31 European countries. While countries outside of Europe are 
not covered, the focus on this region allows near-exhaustive coverage in a large and balanced national 
time series pool, from 1950 onwards. Furthermore, recent financial and economic crises warrant a focus 
on the European context. Several European countries have suffered severely in the post-2008 period, in a 
pattern of crisis referred to as a “domino effect”, because of the interdependence of these economies 
within the European Union (Bellucci et al., 2012: 469). While the crisis has had an especially profound 
impact in the European periphery (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2012), overall considerable variation exists in 
the lived experiences of these European economics (LeDuc and Pammett, 2013). Even though European 
countries share similarities, their substantial differences remain. This combination of unity and diversity, 
then, makes Europe an ideal context to test theories of economic voting (LeDuc and Pammet, 2013). 
For the measures themselves, country-level data were collected from a number of different 
sources. The principal dependent variable in the analyses is incumbent vote share. Election results data 
come from Mackie and Rose (1991), supplemented by election reports in Electoral Studies and the 
European Journal of Political Research . Additionally on-line sources were consulted for information on 
the most recent elections (Nordsieck, 2013). Government coalition information comes from the 
‘Parliament and Government Composition Database, which covers most OECD countries for the post-war 
period (Döring and Manow, 2011). Incumbent vote shares were then calculated by summing the vote 
shares of all parties that were in the government coalition before the elections. (To determine what 
splinter-parties or new parties are to be considered incumbents, we consulted the country-specific 
information found in election reports in Electoral Studies and the European Journal of Political 
Research). As can be observed in Figure 1, the distribution of incumbent vote shares in our dataset shows 
considerable variation, and roughly follows a normal curve (skewness = 0. 44). 
  [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Besides the incumbent vote share, the electoral weight of the incumbent and partisan effects 
should eventually be controlled for as well. Consequently, in order to develop dynamic models, we make 
use of the incumbent vote share in the previous election (E-1). For calculating this variable, the same 
method was applied and the same sources were used as for the construction of the dependent variable, 
incumbent vote share. 
Investigating the effect of the economy on incumbent vote shares, a number of macro-economic 
indicators can be looked at. As already noted, we focus on the GDP growth rate. An additional advantage 
of using GDP growth rate as the economic indicator in our analyses is that long-term time series are 
available for most OECD countries. For the current paper we make use of data on GDP growth rates as 
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reported by the Conference Board (2013), which allows us to go back to 1950. Specifically, we measure 
the GDP growth rate for the year before the election year. This lag structure makes sense, given 
retrospective theory, which suggests voters evaluate the economy over the past year.  
Other variables are also measured. To capture the concept of clarity of responsibility we make use 
of three different measures. First, the effective number of parties in parliament (Anderson, 2000) is 
included to take into account the clarity of available alternatives. Therefore, we make use of the Laakso-
Taagepera (1979) index, as measured and published by Michael Gallagher (2012). Second, the number of 
parties in government is measured, using data from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2011). 
Third, using the same ParlGov database, we measure the presence of caretaker governments before an 
election, including a dummy variable where 1 = the presence of a caretaker government precedes the 
election, and 0 = otherwise. (In our “Challenges” section below, we also discuss the measurement of other 
“test” variables that were introduced). 
Testing the second hypothesis, on the effects of economic crisis, requires more than one measure, 
because “crisis” can be conceptualized in different ways. The first way, popular in the media now, focuses 
on the economic shifts of the post-2008 period. To assess the effects of this current economic crisis, a 
crisis-dummy is included, with all elections from 2008 = 1, while elections before that = 0. The second 
way, which takes a longer view, focuses on theoretical identification and empirical measurement of a year 
of economic crisis, regardless of where that year may fall along the time spectrum. To assess this sort of 
crisis, which in principal could occur at any time, we separate out the negative growth figures, labelling 
them as years of economic crisis. To calibrate the effect of this negative, as compared to positive, 
economic growth, we model the process via spline regressions. (Descriptive statistics on all variables 
included in the analysis are listed in Table 1). 
  [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We include the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those of Western Europe, 
repeatedly and regularly measured over time. For almost all Western European countries the time series 
starts in 1950. For Central and Eastern European countries, the data usually begin around the mid-nineties 
(when they devised functioning competitive elections). These time frames then, correspond to the periods 
in which democracy was clearly established, a prerequisite for testing our hypotheses. (With respect to 
Germany, before unification only West Germany is included, but from 1989 onwards the unified country 
is included. Both are treated as separate countries in the analyses). The full set of countries (31), and 
elections (359), is quite heterogeneous, as can be observed in the listing of Table 2. 
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 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
METHODS 
The data compose a time-series-cross-section (TSCS), a structure to be taken into account when 
modeling. Therefore, different approaches were considered. As a baseline, we estimated static models on 
the effects of different variables on incumbent vote share (without controlling for the previous electoral 
score of the incumbents). Different modeling strategies were investigated. First, a naïve pooled ordinary 
least squares model was examined, its standard errors corrected for the country-clusters. Second, a fixed 
effects (FE) model was developed, in which the country-level effects were simply controlled for by means 
of country-dummies (Allison, 2009). Third, a random effects generalized least squares (GLS) model was 
applied, enabling us to fit an estimator that controls for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Fourth, 
because in general the estimates of a GLS estimation are less efficient, a random coefficient model was 
estimated by means of a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure as well (Hox, 2010). After static models 
were explored, dynamic models were developed, with a control on the effect of the electoral result of 
incumbent parties in the previous election (as a lagged dependent variable – LDV). As with the static 
models, four approaches were investigated; an OLS pooled model, a fixed effects model, a random effects 
GLS model and a random effects ML model.  
While all the approaches are robust to the basic hypotheses, we favor the fixed effects models 
(with panel corrected standard errors - PCSE), which we present in Table 3. The estimates of the static 
model (see Model 1, column 1, Table 3) allow an accounting of non-observed heterogeneity and a 
treatment for omitted variable bias (via inclusion of country-fixed effects). Additionally, we provide panel 
corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995), which address the heteroskedasticity issue. However, 
under this modeling specification a problem of significant autocorrelation remains. A traditional test for 
autocorrelation should not be applied to these pooled time series data. Additionally, the fact that 
incumbent coalitions differ from election to election renders a Woolridge test for autocorrelation (based 
on first differenced regression) inappropriate. Therefore, as an alternative we saved the residuals of Model 
1, comparing them to the residuals of a model in which both the dependent and the independent variables 
are lagged one election. These residuals correlate 0.69, making apparent an autocorrelation problem. For 
this reason we add a lagged dependent variable in Model 2 (see column 2, Table 3). This step renders the 
model dynamic, changing its interpretation and explicitly taking into account the dependency of 
incumbent vote support on its previous result. This second model (FE-PCSE-LDV) embodies the 
specification Beck & Katz (1995; 2009) recommend for dealing with TSCS data, particularly in this 
political science context.i  
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 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
MAIN RESULTS 
The analyses presented in Table 3 are encouraging. First, regardless of whether we consider a 
static or a dynamic model, the fit statistics are strong according to the R2-values. With respect to the 
independent variable effect, we begin the discussion with Model 1. Looking at the control variables, two 
attain statistical significance. These results suggest that as the number of parties in government increases, 
the incumbent vote share increases. Furthermore, the incumbent vote share will tend to be smaller, when 
the system in general has a larger number of parties. Finally, whether a caretaker government was in office 
before the election does not significantly affect the incumbent vote share. These structural results are 
comforting, if unsurprising. What about our main variable of interest, GDP? We observe that it appears to 
have a statistically significant and substantively important effect. Specifically, a one percentage increase 
in GDP growth yields about a 0.7 percentage point increase in incumbent support. This is a rather large 
effect, falling as it does not far from unit elasticity (with its 1:1 percentage ratio).  
 
  [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Model 1 results do indicate strong economic effects. It could be argued, however, that in 
order to investigate the effect of the economy on electoral success and failure, starting points have to be 
taken into account. More specifically, it may be that current incumbent support partly derives from past 
incumbent support. At the microlevel, that process would operate through something like the persistence 
of partisan identification. At the macrolevel, in addition to picking up that pattern, past vote share would 
tap into independent variables omitted from the model specification (including missing variables on 
political context or issues, such as immigration or crime). Thus, it acts as a very strong control, increasing 
predictive power and applying a tough test for the survival of GDP effects. Furthermore, the reported 
presence of serial autocorrelation in Model 1 argues for the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In 
Model 2, therefore, we take Model 1 a step further, including incumbent vote share in the previous 
election as an independent variable. 
 As such, Model 2 incorporates a time component, becoming dynamic and providing further 
insight into the effect of the economy. According to its estimates (see column 2, Table 3), the effect of the 
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GDP growth rate remains significant, even increasing its level (to p < .001). Moreover, its strength 
persists. Indeed, the size of its coefficient is about equal for both modeling approaches (at 0.7). We can 
say, with more confidence, that the state of the economy affects incumbent support on election day. 
Further, the explanatory power of Model 2 is considerably higher, with an R2-value indicating that about 
80% of the variance in incumbent vote share is explained. Last, but not least, we can report that building 
on this specification we tested the possibility of interaction effects relating to the clarity of responsibility 
hypothesis (Powell and Whitten, 1993); no significant results were found there.ii These null findings are 
almost certainly due to the powerful controlling effects of the lagged incumbent vote share variable on the 
right-hand side, and its capturing of the influence of omitted variables).  
 
CRISIS RESULTS 
Our first hypothesis, on the relationship of GDP growth and incumbent support, receives strong 
confirmation from the findings in Table 3. What about our second hypothesis, where we expect the 
economy to relate more strongly to incumbent electoral success during an economic crisis? In order to 
investigate this possibility different approaches are taken. First, we examine whether the link between the 
economy and incumbent vote share is more pronounced after the recent economic and financial crisis, 
begun in 2008. We investigate this by means of a simple crisis-dummy, scored one for elections from 
2008 onwards (i.e., 41 out of the 359 elections) and zero otherwise. For testing, we explore the impact of 
this crisis dummy by itself, and in interaction with the GDP variable. These estimates appear in Table 4. 
The simple 2008 crisis dummy falls far short of statistical significance in both the static and dynamic 
models (see, respectively, columns 1 and 3). Further, the interaction crisis term falls far short of 
significance in the static model, and only achieves marginal significance in the dynamic model. These 
null, fragile results lead us to the following conclusion: while the incumbent governments of Europe may 
have been punished by the post-2008 economic crisis, that punishment has been no greater than for 
economic downturns occurring in other periods. The 2008 economic crisis, then, has not engendered 
unique effects on incumbent party vote shares of the region.  
 The fact that the economic blows falling on elected governments after 2008 are not 
unique does not mean that they were not real blows. But it does mean that another process may be going 
on. Perhaps economic crisis, rather than being temporally specific, works whenever the economy takes a 
serious downturn. In other words, the crisis period need not be, in fact should not be, time bound. Thus, 
we focus on economic downturn in general, by modeling spline regressions. Recall that spline regression 
has value when the research question concerns what produces differences in slope (Marsh and Cormier, 
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2002). Operationalizing zero GDP growth as the turning point (and therefore the spline knot), we can 
investigate whether the GDP growth effect is more or less pronounced depending if it is positive or 
negative. Thus, we investigate differences in the size of the effect for negative and positive GDP growth 
rates, respectively. In order to estimate such a spline regression model, two variables are created. A first 
variable, called GDP (-) corresponds to GDP growth rates if these are negative, but takes on the value of 0 
otherwise. The second variable, called GDP (+) has values corresponding to the GDP growth rates when 
these are positive, but takes on a value of 0 otherwise. Doing so we use the natural and straightforward 
zero threshold for investigating asymmetric economic effects first offered by Nannestad and Paldam, 
1997). 
Applying this spine regression approach, we can observe any differential effects (see columns 2 
and 4, Table 4). Are negative GDP growth rates more determining for incumbent vote share? The results 
of the spline regression models in Table 4 confirm this expectation. In the static, as well as in the dynamic, 
models both the effects of positive and of negative GDP growth attain significance. Additionally, in the 
two models, the coefficient for negative economic growth is larger than the coefficient for positive 
economic growth. Clearly, the results are robust and straightforward: negative economic growth has more 
importance for incumbent electoral results. While the coefficients differ depending on the specific model, 
the negative spline coefficient approaches twice the magnitude of the positive spline coefficient 
(respectively, .99/.63 and 1.00/.66). These findings suggest that the effect of the economy, looked upon 
from a macro-perspective, almost doubles in times of economic recession, compared to times of economic 
growth. Both coefficients are positive, indicating that as the economy is doing better, incumbents obtain a 
larger share of the votes. For example, moving from a -2% to a -1% GDP growth rate has close to twice 
the effect on incumbent support, compared to moving from 1% to 2% GDP growth rate. Clearly, 
economic crisis, understood as the general phenomenon of negative economic growth, intensifies the 
impact of GDP change on incumbent vote, so supporting our second hypothesis.  
 
CHALLENGES 
Thus far, we have found strong support for our two central hypotheses, in terms of the functioning 
of these European democracies. First, in general, economic growth relates to incumbent vote support as 
expected. In particular, negative economic growth generally yields decreases in incumbent vote support.  
Second, the relationship between economic growth and incumbent vote support strengthens under 
economic crisis. In particular, it takes an asymmetric form, with negative economic growth having a 
greater impact than positive economic growth. As firm as these findings appear to be, they are not immune 
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from challenge. In this section, we consider several relevant challenges, from the measurement of the 
dependent variable of incumbent vote and the independent variable of economic performance, to the 
specification of the non-economic independent variables. Below, we consider these in turn, beginning 
with the measurement questions, and ending with the specification questions.  
Initially, we face the question of whether the dependent variable should be incumbent coalition 
votes (as it is now), or (the more restricted) prime minister party votes. The latter has been argued by some 
to be relatively more affected by economic outcomes (see Anderson, 2000; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). 
To test this possibility, we simply substituted prime minister party vote share for the dependent variable 
(and the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side) in the basic dynamic Model 2 of Table 3. 
Contrary to rival argument, the general effect of the economy now appears halved (i.e., a GDP growth 
coefficient of only .39, compared to its Table 3 value of .74).iii Additionally, our hypothesis of 
asymmetrical economic effects fails of support, when the dependent variable is prime minister party 
support. At least two reasons for these weaker findings present themselves. First, while the distribution of 
vote share of the incumbent coalition approximates normality, the distribution of prime minister vote share 
variable is noticeably skewed. Second, while ruling coalitions generally have a combined vote share close 
to 50% across these countries, the electoral strength of the prime minister’s party varies much more, 
according to country- and electoral-system-specific characteristics. This fact renders the pooled approach 
a more blunt instrument of analysis. Clearly, given the distributional complexities embedded in this large 
TSCS data-set, our more global dependent variable measure of incumbency support appears preferred. 
With respect to the key independent variable – the economy – we have relied on our GDP 
measure. But we might reasonably ask what would happen if a leading rival indicator – the unemployment 
rate – were used? Therefore, we perform the main analyses with change in unemployment rates instead of 
GDP growth as the economic variable. It is operationalized as the difference between the unemployment 
rate one year before the election year, and the unemployment rate two years before the election year. The 
necessary data, from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2013), make for smaller sample, only 
covering elections from 1980. Still, the results are suggestive. First, in an estimation comparable to that of 
Model 2 (Table 3), where unemployment is substituted for GDP, one observes that rising unemployment 
rates significantly harm incumbent vote share, as expected. Additionally, replicating the crisis analysis of 
Model 2 (Table 4) with the substitution of the unemployment variables suggests similar asymmetrical 
effects. As expected, increasing unemployment (hinting at a deteriorating economy) has a more profound 
effect on incumbent vote share, compared to decreasing unemployment (hinting at a growing economy).iv 
We can therefore conclude that the findings of an asymmetrical economic effect presented in the 
manuscript are not likely driven by specificities of the GDP growth-indicator. Hence, we continue to favor 
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the GDP measure over this unemployment measure. In addition to the theoretical and empirical reasons 
already advanced, using the unemployment measures gives an available sample size of just 181, about half 
that of Table 3. Moreover, in part because of this smaller sample, the statistical significance levels are not 
nearly as impressive. 
Beyond the above considerations of measurement of the key dependent and independent variables, 
there could be concern over whether more predictor variables should be added to the specification. On that 
issue, it is important to first recall that the dynamic model contains a lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side of the equation (LDV). Fortunately, the presence of this LDV also acts as a control on 
omitted variables (assuming they also operate at t-1). While this makes for considerable confidence in the 
desirable statistical properties of the GDP coefficients, attention to other available independent variables 
still has merit. There are two in particular: globalization and democratic history. Take the former first. The 
process of globalization has been important over the period covered (1950-2013). We especially want to 
know whether, in accounting for globalization, economic growth still functions asymmetrically under 
crisis. Therefore, we investigate the main and interaction effects of globalization, as measured by trade 
openness, adding it to the specification (of the dynamic FE PCSE LDV model of Table 4, column 4).  
Following Fernandez-Albertos (2006), we use as a measure the sum of imports and exports of a country 
divided by GDP. Data were obtained from the World Bank database and are available only from 1960 
onwards, so yielding a somewhat smaller sample size (The World Bank 2013a; 2013b).. Looking at the 
results, in Table 5 (column 1), we observe that trade openness has neither statistically significant main or 
interaction effects. Hence, globalization, as measured by trade openness, does not seem to alter the 
reported asymmetrical effects of GDP growth rates. (Furthermore, these spline regression effects from 
GDP sustain their significance, with negative growth continuing to exercise about twice the effect of 
positive growth). 
 
  [TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 Take the second specification concern raised, regarding the different democratic histories of these 
nations, most notably those who were formerly communist systems. Rather than simply including a post-
communist dummy in the analyses, we offer a more general operationalization of experience with 
electoral democracy. We add to our key model the ‘years of stable democracy,’ a variable which we 
created by means of information from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Gurr, 2012). We present the 
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results in Table 5 (column 2). The main effect of years of democracy is negative and significant, 
indicating that as countries have more experience with electoral democracy, incumbents tend to obtain a 
smaller vote share. However, the interactions of years of democracy with negative and positive GDP 
growth are not significant, indicating that the different electoral histories for democracy do not affect the 
mechanism of economic voting in the region. This conclusion receives reinforcement by observing that 
the two key coefficients, for negative GDP growth and positive GDP growth, are very close in magnitude 
to their original values in the key model of Table 4 (column 2).  
Besides the question of differing democratic histories, the question arises of different levels of 
economic development, which might bias growth effects on incumbent support. For example, would a 
percentage point of economic growth in the United Kingdom (a developed industrial economy) have the 
same effect on incumbent support as a percentage point of economic growth in Romania (a post-
communist developing economy)? Given the economic heterogeneity of this national pool, we should 
address the matter. An especially efficient way to do so involves the use of random effects estimation 
instead of a fixed effects model. That is, rather than controlling away the variance at the country-level via 
country-dummies (as done with a fixed effects model), we explicitly investigate this variance (Hox, 2010). 
Such a random coefficient ML estimation procedure allows the investigation of varying intercepts 
between countries, but also of random slopes. To see whether there is variation between countries in the 
effect of a specific variable – here GDP growth – one examines these random slopes.  
In Table 6 we present the results of random effects MLE models (using the specification of Table 
4, column 2). The first equation offers the base model, where random country-intercepts are specified; in 
the second equation we also assess any significant country-level variance in the effect of GDP growth. A 
number of conclusions can be drawn. First, the earlier findings in the manuscript are robust to a random 
effects ML specification, where we observe again an asymmetrical effect of economic voting on the 
incumbent vote share. Second, a significant and substantial amount of variance in incumbent vote share 
exists at the country level. Third, and most pointedly, we do not observe significant country-level 
variation in the effect of GDP growth on incumbent vote share (as shown in the σ2-values at the bottom of 
the table). The economic development level, country-to-country, does not significantly impact the 
economic voting coefficient. In addition to making this clear, the result supports our more direct fixed 
effects approach (of the earlier tables). 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
CONCLUSION 
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 Economic voting seems undeniable, according to the numerous micro-level, election survey 
studies undertaken around the democratic world. These results refute the charge of an ecological fallacy, 
with respect to the inference that economic perceptions influence vote choice. However, economic voting 
theory has another charge to overcome, that of commiting a micrological fallacy. We have argued the 
plausiblity of the notion that, while individual citizens may be economic voters, the entire electorate itself 
may not act like an economic voter. In other words, those individual economic vote choices might not add 
up to a macroeconomic impact on the incumbent government’s vote share. This possibility we base not 
only on logic, but on the weak empirical results from numerous aggregate investigations, which have 
attempted to link macroeconomic fluctuations to overall electoral outcomes.  
Herein, we attempt to show a micrological fallacy has not been committed, by demonstrating an 
unambigous connection between GDP growth and aggregate incumbent vote share in European 
democratic elections. We explore a very large pool of elections (359) from many countries (31) over an 
extended time period (1950-2013). While the countries confine themselves to the European continent, they 
nevertheless represent considerable political and economic heterogeneity. Our analyses, and their various 
challenges, reveal sharp and powerful effects. In general, a one percentage point change in economic 
growth produces almost a three-quarter percentage point change in incumbent vote support. This clear 
confirmation of our first hypothesis has merit in its own right. However, it has a double importance, by its 
refutation of the micrological fallacy. That macro-refutation of the micrological fallacy, along with the 
micro-refutation of the ecological fallacy, make for a perfect marriage. With unparalleled confidence, we 
can assert that economic voting is real, and really matters. 
.This confidence allowed us to pursue our second hypothesis with vigor. Economic crisis alters 
the impact of growth on the vote, rendering it asymmetric. Economic crisis, defined as negative GDP 
growth, can occur anywhere along the time line. And, when these bad economic times occur, its electoral 
impact is magnified, compared to economic good times. Specifically, the cost in incumbent votes from an 
economic bust (e.g., a negative growth of – 1%) comes to about double the benefit in incumbent votes 
received from an economic boom (e.g., a positive growth of +1%). Thus, we see that governments are 
punished more for bad economic policy, than they are rewarded for good economic policy. Perhaps that is 
as it should be, for it pushes governments to work harder at reducing mass hardship. Further, this 
asymmetry in reward and punishment suggests that leaders are held especially accountable for poor 
performance. If so, it serves as a useful reminder to elected officials that the people are paying attention. 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of variables in the analyses 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Incumbent vote share 359 45.72 15.79 5.60 96.80 
Incumbent vote share (E-1) 359 50.36 14.03 10.20 97.90 
GDP growth rate 359 3.27 3.41 -12.84 20.81 
GDP growth rate (-) 359 -.30 1.29 -12.84 0.00 
GDP growth (+) 359 3.57 2.80 0.00 20.81 
Caretaker government 359 0.09 0.29 0 1 
ENEP 359 4.47 1.70 1.70 13.82 
Number of parties in 
government 
359 2.20 1.15 1 6 
Crisis (2008 onwards) 359 0.11 0.32 0 1 
 
TABLE 2. Cases included in the analyses 
Country # % Period 
Austria 18 5.01 1953-2008 
Belgium 18 5.01 1954-2010 
Britain 15 4.18 1955-2010 
Bulgaria 5 1.39 1994-2009 
Cyprus 7 1.95 1981-2011 
Czech Republic 5 1.39 1996-2010 
Denmark 23 6.41 1953-2011 
Estonia 5 1.39 1995-2011 
Finland 16 4.46 1954-2011 
France 15 4.18 1956-2012 
Germany 5 1.39 1994-2009 
Greece 14 3.90 1977-2012 
Hungary 5 1.39 1994-2010 
Iceland 19 5.29 1953-2013 
Ireland 17 4.74 1953-2011 
Italy 16 4.46 1953-2013 
Latvia 5 1.39 1995-2011 
Lithuania 5 1.39 1996-2012 
Luxembourg 12 3.34 1954-2009 
Malta 10 2.79 1966-2008 
Netherlands 19 5.29 1952-2012 
Norway 15 4.18 1953-2009 
Poland 6 1.67 1993-2011 
Portugal 11 3.06 1980-2011 
Romania 6 1.67 1992-2012 
Slovak Republic 6 1.67 1994-2012 
Slovenia 6 1.67 1992-2011 
Spain 10 2.79 1979-2011 
Sweden 19 5.29 1952-2010 
Switzerland 15 4.18 1955-2011 
West Germany 11 3.06 1953-1990 
Total 359 100.00 1952-2013 
 
TABLE 3. Effect of the economy on incumbent vote shares 
 Model 1: Static 
FE PCSE 
Model 2: Dynamic 
FE PCSE LDV 
Incumbent vote share (e-1)  0.844*** 
(0.043) 
GDP growth 0.713** 
(0.214) 
0.737*** 
(0.146) 
Caretaker government 3.190 
(2.670) 
2.136 
(1.519) 
ENEP (e-1) -2.614*** 
(0.493) 
0.780 
(0.438) 
Number of parties in government 7.009*** 
(1.013) 
0.347 
(0.576) 
Constant 56.629*** 
(4.937) 
2.730 
(3.318) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Nelections 359 359 
Ncountries 31 31 
R2 0.611 0.809 
Sign: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). Panel corrected standard errors reported.  
 
TABLE 4. Crisis effects 
 Model 1: Static 
FE PCSE 
Model 2: Dynamic 
FE PCSE LDV 
 Interaction 
Crisis*GDP 
Splines 
regression 
Interaction 
Crisis*GDP 
Splines 
regression 
Incumbent vote share (e-1)   0.845*** 
(0.041) 
0.844*** 
(0.043) 
GDP growth 0.575* 
(0.244) 
 0.601*** 
(0.143) 
 
Negative GDP growth   0.988* 
(0.474) 
 1.001** 
(0.387) 
Positive GDP growth  0.631* 
(0.267) 
 0.657*** 
(0.146) 
Post-2008 crisis -3.668 
(2.219) 
 -1.951 
(1.576) 
 
Post-2008 crisis*GDP growth 
 
0.322 
(0.303) 
 0.675* 
(0.319) 
 
Caretaker government 3.442 
(2.646) 
3.434 
(2.731) 
2.448 
(1.486) 
2.370 
(1.528) 
ENEP (e-1) -2.640*** 
(0.494) 
-2.627*** 
(0.504) 
0.810 
(0.426) 
0.768 
(0.449) 
Number of parties in 
government 
7.132*** 
(1.019) 
7.032*** 
(1.028) 
0.355 
(0.543) 
0.370 
(0.596) 
Constant 57.103*** 
(5.048) 
56.916*** 
(5.036) 
3.001 
(3.316) 
3.010 
(3.394) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nelections 359 359 359 359 
Ncountries 31 31 31 31 
R2 0.615 0.611 0.812 0.810 
Sign: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). Panel corrected standard errors reported.  
 
TABLE 5. The mediating effect of trade openness and years of democratic stability on the effect of 
GDP on the incumbent vote share  
 Model 1: Dynamic 
FE PCSE LDV 
Model 2: Dynamic 
FE PCSE LDV 
Incumbent vote share (e-1) 0.780 *** 
(0.057) 
0.831*** 
(0.048) 
Negative GDP growth 2.306* 
(1.061) 
0.925* 
(0.425) 
Positive GDP growth 1.101** 
(0.408) 
0.563* 
(0.249) 
Trade openness -0.030 
(0.048) 
 
Trade openness*Negative GDP 
growth 
-0.031 
(0.023) 
 
Trade openness*Positive GDP 
growth 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
 
Years of stable democracy  -0.096*** 
(0.028) 
Years of stable democracy* 
Negative GDP growth 
 0.003 
(0.006) 
Years of stable democracy* 
Positive GDP growth 
 -0.004 
(0.004) 
Caretaker government 2.693 
(1.870) 
1.600 
(1.604) 
ENEP (e-1) 0.875 
(0.449) 
1.079* 
(0.435) 
Number of parties in government 0.453 
(0.684) 
0.590 
(0.603) 
Constant 5.887 
(4.661) 
6.681 
(3.517) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Nelections 331 359 
Ncountries 31 31 
R2 0.773 0.819 
Sign: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). Panel corrected standard errors reported.  
    
 
TABLE 6. Random slope of GDP growth 
 Model 1: Dynamic 
Random effects ML 
Model 2: Dynamic 
Random effects ML 
Incumbent vote share (e-1) 0.849*** 
(0.044) 
0.855*** 
(0.044) 
Negative GDP growth 1.159*** 
(0.347) 
1.189* 
(0.481) 
Positive GDP growth 0.572*** 
(0.158) 
0.594*** 
(0.173) 
Caretaker government 1.683 
(1.527) 
2.723 
(1.559) 
ENEP (e-1) 0.253 
(0.386) 
0.280 
(0.386) 
Number of parties in government 0.697 
(0.622) 
0.585 
(0.623) 
Constant -2.770 
(2.929) 
-3.049 
(2.930) 
σ2 countries 26.135** 
(9.527) 
26.726** 
(10.571) 
σ2 negative GDP growth  0.983 
(1.220) 
σ2 positive GDP growth  0.104 
(0.215) 
Nelections 359 359 
Ncountries 31 31 
Rho 0.332 0.356 
LLintercept -1532.7302 -1532.7302 
LLfull model -1248.7998 -1247.7375 
Sign: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). 
 
 
Figure 1. Dependent variable: incumbent vote share (%) 
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 Endnotes 
                                                                 
i It is known that estimates from an FE and LDV model may be biased, with this bias increasing as T (i.e. 
number of elections in a country) becomes smaller. One approach to overcoming this source of bias is to 
use a difference GMM (generalized method of moments) estimator. But these data cannot be fully 
considered as panels, since we are not following the same incumbents over time. Rather, the incumbent 
parties change from election to election. Consequently using, for example, an Arellano and Bond 
estimator with its automatic autocorrelation correction (at two lags of the dependent variable) would be 
incorrect. The results from several Monte Carlo simulation, however, indicate that, assuming a sound 
specification, the approach used here in dynamic Model 2 performs“as well or better than more 
complicated IV estimators ” (Adolph, et al., 2005: 18) [see also: Beck and Katz, 2009; Judson and Owen, 
1999]. 
ii Results are not shown, but are available from the authors on request.  
iii Results are not shown, but are available from the authors on request.  
iv Results are not shown, but are available from the authors on request.  
